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Is information diffusion a threat to market power for financial access? Insights from the 
African banking industry 
 
Abstract 
This study assesses how information diffusion dampens the adverse effect of market power on 
the price and quantity of loans provided by a panel of 162 banks from 39 African countries for 
the period 2001-2011. First, from the Generalised Method of Moments results, a mobile 
phone penetration rate of 54.29, rising to 57 per 100 people are predicted to neutralise the 
adverse effect of market power on the average loan price and quantity respectively. Second, 
from the Quantile Regressions, mobile phone penetration rates of 56.20, 52.04 and 42.76 per 
100 people is needed to nullify the negative effect of market power on loan quantity at the 
10
th
 decile, 25
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile respectively. Third, a considerably lower internet 
penetration rate of 9.49 per 100 people is required to counteract the negative impact of market 
power on loan quantity at the 90
th
 decile.  Policy implications are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
There are four principal motivations for examining whether information diffusion threatens 
market power in order to enhance financial access in the African banking industry, notably: 
the high potential for information and communication technology (ICT) penetration in Africa; 
surplus liquidity and market power issues in banks of the continent; the relevance of 
information diffusion in reducing market power for financial access and gaps in the literature. 
The four motivations are substantiated in chronological order.  
First, compared to the rest of the world, there is a higher potential for penetration of 
mechanisms of information technology in Africa. Consistent with recent literature, whereas 
high-end economies in North America, Europe and Asia are witnessing saturation points in 
the growth of ICT, there is yet considerable  room for ICT penetration in Africa (Penard et al., 
2012; Asongu, 2018; Afutu-Kotey et al., 2017; Bongomin et al., 2018; Gosavi, 2017). This 
implies that policy can leverage on such penetration potential to address development 
concerns, inter alia limited financial access. 
 Second, banks in Africa are characterised by issues of surplus liquidity (Saxegaard, 
2006; Fouda, 2009; Asongu, 2014), which is paradoxical in the light of  the experience of 
households and corporations with  limited access to credit (Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; 
Darley, 2012). Some of the documented determinants of surplus liquidity include: lack of 
borrowing collateral, absence of bank accounts, lack of credit histories, absence of good 
infrastructure that may oblige bank branches in remote areas to hold cash in excess of 
statutory limits and the abuse of market power by big banks (Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017).  
 Third, information diffusion can reduce market power or limit data privileges and 
informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks. Big banks can use such advantages to set 
the price of loans above marginal costs in order to increase their profit margins. This intuition 
is consistent with Bergemanny et al. (2015) who have argued that the interaction of market 
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power and information is crucial in comprehending the distribution of quantities and prices 
that result in economic equilibrium.   
 Fourth, recent literature has suggested that financial institutions in the African banking 
industry may be abusing their market power in order to limit access to finance (Boateng et al., 
2018). In other words, such financial intermediaries may be more concerned with enjoying a 
‘quiet life’1 instead of increasing financial access (Asongu et al., 2016a). Unfortunately, 
Africa has not been given the scholarly attention it deserves. This is essentially because, as the 
continent with the most severe financial access issues, studies devoted to assessing the 
influence of market power in the African banking industry are sparse (see Table 1).  
 This inquiry therefore aims to complement existing literature and policy challenges by 
merging the four strands above in assessing how information diffusion dampens the 
potentially negative effect of market power on financial access in the African banking 
industry. The results are linked to have policies which should enhance access to mobilised 
deposits in the banking sector for both households and small businesses. This leads to 
increased consumption, investment, productivity, employment and ultimately economic 
prosperity.  
 In the light of the above, the research question this study aims to answer is the 
following: is information diffusion a threat to market power for financial access? As 
summarised in Table 1 and Section 2, the extant literature has not addressed the research gap 
this research question seeks to answer. Hence, our study departs from the discussed literature 
in Section 2 by assessing how the potential for ICT penetration (covered in the first strand of 
the introduction) can be leveraged to mitigate market power (discussed in the third strand) in 
order to increase financial access (covered in the second strand) and extend the literature on 
                                                          
1
 The Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) postulates that financial institutions with high market power would invest 
less to enhance financial access. According to the assumption, instead of using their favourable market position 
to enhance intermediation efficiency, such banks tend to exploit such ‘market power’ to increase their gains or 
enjoy a ‘quiet life’ (Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010). 
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market power in the banking industry (highlighted in the fourth strand).  In what follows, we 
complement the motivation of the study by outlining the research framework (data and 
methodological insights), summarizing the key findings and contextualizing the contribution 
of key findings in the light of extant literature. 
 In order to assess whether information diffusion is a threat to market power for 
financial access in a panel of 162 banks from 39 African countries for the period 2001-2011, 
we first derive the Lerner index or market power by estimating a translog cost function.  
Then, we employ three simultaneity-robust empirical strategies, namely:  (i) Two-Stage Least 
Squares (2SLS) to control for simultaneity, (ii) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) to 
account for simultaneity,  the unobserved heterogeneity and persistence in financial access 
(i.e. in loan price and loan quantity)  and (iii) Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions  
(QR) to control for simultaneity and existing levels of financial access.  
 Three main findings are established. First, from the GMM results, a mobile phone 
penetration rate of 54.29, rising to 57 per 100 people are predicted to neutralise the adverse 
effect of market power on the average loan price and quantity respectively. Second, from the 
QR, mobile phone penetration rates of 56.20, 52.04 and 42.76 per 100 people is needed to 
nullify the negative effect of market power on loan quantity at the 10
th
 decile, 25
th
 quartile and 
90
th
 decile respectively. Third, a considerably lower internet penetration rate of 9.49 per 100 
people is required to counteract the negative impact of market power on loan quantity at the 
90
th
 decile. 
 The above findings contribute to the scholarly literature in at least three ways.  
First, by employing ICT channels, our study complements a recent strand of African 
financial development literature which has exclusively focused on information sharing offices 
(such as private credit bureaus and public credit registries) as information sharing 
mechanisms in the diffusion of knowledge for the reduction of information asymmetry 
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between lenders and borrowers in the banking industry, notably: Kusi et al. (2017) who have 
concluded that the sharing of information reduces bank credit risk, Kusi and Opoku‐ Mensah  
(2018) who have established that such information sharing mitigates the cost of funding while 
Muaza and Alagidede (2017) who have concluded that,  the financial access benefits from 
information sharing are more apparent in English common law countries compared to their 
French civil law counterparts.  
Second, the findings also enlighten another strand of recent African banking literature 
which has postulated that the ineffectiveness of information sharing offices in Africa may be 
due to the abuse of market power by large financial institutions (Triki & Gajigo, 2014; 
Asongu et al., 2016a). It is important to note that the concept of market power is not directly 
engaged by this strand of literature. Hence, by directly engaging the concept of market power 
in this study, the findings provide insights into whether ICT mechanisms (which are 
complementary to information sharing offices) are reducing information asymmetry 
associated with market power in order to increase financial access in the African banking 
industry. 
Third, some of the insignificant findings on the relevance of ICT in modulating the 
effect of market power on financial access may imply that market power in the African 
banking industry may be so strong that its effect on financial access cannot easily be 
modulated by ICT of low penetration. Hence, the insignificant findings should not be 
observed in the light of publication bias or the file drawer concern in social sciences, where 
compared to strong results that are more likely to be published,  insignificant and null findings 
are not published and discarded  (Rosenberg, 2005; Franco et al., 2014). 
The rest of the investigation is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses linkages 
between information flow, market power and financial access. The data and methodology are 
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covered in Section 3 while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with 
future research directions.   
 
2. Information Diffusion, Market Power and Financial Access  
2.1. Information diffusion and theoretical underpinnings  
By playing a fundamental role in information diffusion, ICT improves governance and 
reduces the abuse of government power by facilitating transparency, openness and the free-
flow of information between various institutions and departments in the government 
(Hellstrom, 20008). For example, in accordance with the narrative, mobile telephony enables: 
(i) the free flow of information between citizens and authorities and (ii) direct involvement of 
citizens in processes of governance.  In summary, advantages of a mobile phone can also be 
reaped in the banking industry because by making financial institutions more connected and  
up-to-date, it encourages customers to be more participative in the process of lending. Such   
could decrease the informational rents previously enjoyed by big banks.  
Ultimately, information flow has the potential for decreasing the asymmetry between 
lenders and borrowers. On the one hand, ex-ante of lending, information distribution can 
mitigate the adverse selection of banks (especially big banks) by enabling them to be better 
informed about borrowers’ creditworthiness. On the other, ex-post of lending, the potential for 
moral hazard can be substantially limited because the circulation of information improves 
transparency and accountability. Such should prevent borrowers from concealing activities for 
which they borrowed funds as well as the earning there-from.  
 In the light of the above, the role of ICT in reducing market power in the banking 
industry is not so different from how ICT decreases the abuse of power by the ruling elite.  On 
the potential role of ICT in decreasing market power, Snow (2009, pp. 337-339) has 
documented some theoretical underpinnings. According to Snow, the historic dearth of ICT 
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provided those with power and authority with privileged information and communication 
facilities that substantially constrained transparency and promoted corruption.  
 Conversely, the rapid diffusion of information (by means of ICT) has shrunk the 
secrecy barriers and rents by inter alia: altering cost-benefit calculations and increasing 
oversight.  These propositions are founded on the intuition that information monopoly among 
the elite in government or banking industry is an avenue for the abuse of power. Hence, the 
decentralisation of information through ICT reduces opportunities for those in government 
and banking circles to take advantage of their privileged positions. The theoretical 
foundations are broadly in line with the growing number of papers on the interconnections 
between ICT, governance and the abuse of power on the one hand (Boulianne, 2009; 
Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014) and on the other, the evolving stream of literature on 
the relevance of ICT in collective action against the abuse of power (Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 
2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016).  
 
2.2. Market power and financial access  
 Issues surrounding the relationship between market power and financial access have 
occupied an important part of scholarly research over the past three decades (Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981; Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007; Boateng et al., 2018). Such an interest from 
scholars was for the most part inspired by the inefficiencies associated with market power, 
notably: net losses in social and economic welfare (Maudo & Fernandez de Guevara, 2007).  
According to dominant narratives in the literature, market power reduces investment, lowers 
savings, increases financial intermediation inefficiency and decreases avenues of economic 
prosperity (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Djankov et al., 2007).   
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Table 1: Summary of empirical literature on the abuse of market power 
Author(s) Regions (Period) Abuse of market power? 
   
Tu & Chen (2000)  Taiwan (1986-1999) Yes 
   
Weill (2004) Europe (1994-1999) No 
   
Maudos & de Guevara (2007) Europe (1993-2002) No 
   
Koetter & Vins (2008) Germany (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Koetter et al. (2008) USA (1986-2006) No 
   
Pruteanu-Podpiera et al. (2008) Czech Republic (1994-2005)  No 
   
Schaeck & Cihak (2008) Europe & USA (1995-2005) Yes 
   
Al-Jarrah & Gharaibeh (2009) Jordan (2001-2005) No 
   
 
Solis & Maudos (2008)  
 
Mexico (1993-2005) 
No (for deposit market) 
Yes (for loans market) 
   
Al-Muharrami & Mathews (2009)  Arab Gulf (1993-2002) No 
   
Fan & Marton (2011) SEE  (1998-2008) No 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009) China (1985-2002) No 
   
Delis & Tsionas (2009) Europe (1996-2006) Yes 
   
Fu & Heffernan (2009)  China (1985-2002) No 
   
Punt &van Rooij(2009) EU (1992-1997) No 
   
Ariss (2010) A sample of developing countries 
(1999-2005) 
Yes (cost efficiency) 
 No (profit efficiency) 
   
Coccorese & Pellecchia (2010) Italy (1992-2007) Yes 
   
Tetsushi et al. (2014) Japan (1974-2005) Yes 
   
Titko & Dauylbaev (2015) Baltic countries (2007-2013) No 
   
Sources: Coccorese and Pellecchia (2010); Titko and Dauylbaev (2015) and Authors. SEE: South East European countries. EU: Europe 
Union.  
 
More recent evidence however suggests that in relation to banks with substantial market 
power, smaller banks are associated with lower interest margins (Beck & Hesse, 2006; 
Ahokpossi, 2013). This suggestion is in line with Beck and Hesse (2006) and   Ngigi (2013a, 
2013b) who established that bank size substantially affects differences in cost of loans with 
associated interest rate spreads/margins.  
From a theoretical perspective it is expected that banks with higher market power are 
more likely to maintain lower margins of interest because of economies of scale and other 
inherent advantages associated with size. Large sized banks may however, pursue objectives 
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of financial intermediation inefficiency with the core purpose of increasing their profit 
margins (Mitchell & Onvural, 1996). Unfortunately, the African continent is not receiving the 
scholarly attention it deserves in the literature on market power, despite being the continent 
with the most severe constraints to financial access. As summarised in Table 1, with the 
exception of the study by Ariss (2010) which has sampled a few African countries, the bulk of 
the literature on market power has not involved the continent.  
 
2.3 Information sharing and market power  
As recently documented in the literature (Lin et al., 2011; Boateng et al., 2018), the sharing of 
information can reduce information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in the banking 
industry. Information asymmetry in the banking industry is inherently associated with market 
power because powerful banks use privileged information to extract informational rents from 
borrowers. In accordance with Jappelli and Pagano (2002), the theoretical linkage between 
information sharing and market power is founded on the anticipation that the former increases 
competition within the banking sector. This position is consistent with Asongu and Odhiambo 
(2018) on the connection between information sharing and banking sector competition. 
Accordingly, the sharing of information increases competition between banks since 
informational rents that were previously reaped by powerful banks are decreased by 
information sharing mechanisms. Hence, by reducing market power and rendering credit 
market contestable, the sharing of information by means of ICT mechanisms, reduces credit 
constraints and enables efficient capital allocation. However, in spite of the anticipated 
rewards of information sharing mechanisms, a recent strand of financial access literature is of 
the position that when information systems are undeveloped, large banks can still reap 
informational rents associated with their market power (Luoto et al., 2007).  
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          The position that large banks can use information diffusion to increase their margins of 
profits instead of improving credit access is supported by Brown and Zehnder (2010). Other 
views maintain that higher interest rates charged by big banks for enhanced profit margins are 
traceable to the inefficiencies that are associated with the coordination and management of 
operations in big financial institutions due to diseconomies of scale (Noulas et al., 1990; 
Mester, 1992; Karray & Chichti, 2013). Such abuse of market power for greater interest 
margins has been the premised of a recent strand of African banking literature on information 
sharing (Barth et al., 2009; Asongu et al., 2016a; Triki & Gajigo, 2014). Unfortunately, these 
studies have not directly engaged market power in the assessment of the relevance of 
information sharing in financial access.  
 
2.4 Information sharing and financial access  
There is a substantial bulk of literature that is premised on the importance of information 
sharing in facilitating access to credit (Padilla & Pagano, 2000; Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; 
Karapetyan & Stacescu, 2014a, 2014b; Boateng et al., 2018). In what follows, we discuss 
some extant studies on the relevance of information sharing and credit access. 
                One strand of the literature argues that information sharing reduces adverse 
selection, mitigates moral hazard, disciplines borrowers and increase competition within the 
banking sector. In the theoretical models of most studies in this strand (Padilla & Pagano, 
1997, 2000; Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, 2006; Bennardo et al., 2015), it is argued that the 
sharing of information reduces difference in information across banks which, increases their 
abilities to make more informed decisions and lend more to borrowers. Moreover, the 
perspective that improved information is associated with lower rates of default and more 
lending is supported by Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014a) and Klein (1992) who have argued 
that when more information is available to lenders, borrowers are more likely to comply with 
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their financial obligations towards banks. In Africa, Kusi et al. (2017) conclude that the 
sharing of information reduces bank credit risk, Kusi and Opoku‐ Mensah  (2018) establish 
that such information sharing mitigates the cost of funding while Muaza and Alagidede 
(2017) conclude that,  the financial access benefits from information sharing are more 
apparent in English common law countries compared to their French civil law counterparts.  
 A contending strand of the literature points to the dark side of sharing information.  
For instance, Jappelli and Pagano (2006) maintain that the sharing of information could also 
increase lending to riskier borrowers while Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) establish  that 
systematic sharing of information between banks leads to banking crisis. It is also argued in 
this strand of literature that owing to enhanced information sharing through credit agencies, 
some banks can consolidate their competitive advantage by collecting more strategic 
information that is not eventually shared through information sharing mechanisms (Petersen 
& Rajan, 1995; Vercammen,1995; Hauswald & Marquez, 2003; Karapetyan & Stacescu, 
2014a, 2014b). The contending strands discussed in this section support the power theories of 
credit (Townsend, 1979; Stiglitz &  Weiss, 1981;  Aghion &  Bolton, 1992) which are 
premised on the position that the market power of creditors and information represent the two 
main drivers of credit decisions in the banking industry.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
3.1 Estimation of Market Power (Lerner Index)  
Consistent with recent literature (Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & Biekpe, 2018), this study 
employs the stochastic frontier model for the estimation of the Lerner index which is 
considered as an indicator of market power. The estimation of the Lerner index from the 
Battese and Coelli (1992) model is presented in Appendix 1. According to  Coccorese and 
Pellecchia (2010), compared to other models that are based on estimation approaches linked 
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to deterministic frontiers (Aigner & Chu, 1968; Farrell, 1957), the adopted model is more 
efficient. This is essentially because the adopted model takes into consideration the fact that, 
owing to the inefficiency of corporations, gaps between frontier output and observed output 
could stem from other factors such as measurement errors and stochastic shocks.                   
 Let us assume that for firm i  at time t , production costs depend on input prices (W ), 
output ( Q ), random error ( v ) and inefficiency ( u ).  
Assuming that the random error and inefficiency terms are identically and independently 
distributed (iid), the logarithmic specification associated with the cost function can be 
presented as follows in Equation (1): 
 ititititit uvWQfC  ),(ln  ,                                                                          (1)      
where the non-negative inefficiency and error term terms are iid, following respectively, a 
truncated normal distribution and a normal distribution. Therefore, whereas itv  is 
²),0( vN  , itu  is ²),( uN  .       
The translog cost function is employed  in the modelling of the cost. It entails one output and 
three inputs. The function  which was first proposed by Christensen et al. (1971),  has been 
widely employed in the  empirical literature (Koetter & Vins, 2008;  Ariss, 2010; Coccorese 
& Pellecchia, 2010).  
The cost function is as follows in Equation (2):  






 

3
1
3
1
2
3
1
10 lnln)(ln
2
1
lnlnln
k
kithithk
h
itQQhit
h
hitit WWQWQC   
                   itithitit
h
Qh uvWQ 

lnln
3
1

  ,                                                                      (2) 
14 
 
where Ni ,........1  and  Tt .........1 , are subscripts of banks and time respectively.
 
C is 
the total cost,  Q  is the output, hW  are factor prices, kW  are factor quantities and , while itu  
and itv  are respectively the error and inefficiency terms.  
 In the estimation of the cost function, three inputs and one output are specified. The 
total operating cost is defined with the following: price of labor,  price of capital, inputs by the 
price of deposits and output in terms of total assets and total operating cost measured with 
overheads
2
.  As shown in Equation (4), the Lerner index is computed from the price and the 
marginal cost. While the latter is derived from the translog cost function’s output in Equation 
(3), the former reflects the price charged by financial institutions  on  their total assets   or 
output and it is computed as the ratio of total revenues (net noninterest income plus interest 
income) to total assets.  
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where itP  is the price charged by a bank on its output. From a theoretical perspective,  the 
Lerner index can vary between 0 (in case of perfect competition) and 1 (an exclusive 
monopoly). 
3.2 Data 
 This study examines 39 countries consisting of a panel of 162 banks with data for the 
period 2001-2011
3
. The data sources are World Development Indicators of the World Bank 
                                                          
2
 The deposit price is calculated by dividing interest expenses by the sum of deposits, short term funding plus 
money market. The price of labor is defined as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets. The price of capital 
is equal to the ratio of ‘other operating costs’ to the value of fixed assets.  
3
 The sampled countries are: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
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and Bankscope. The adopted periodicity, number of countries and number of banks are due to 
constraints in the availability of data. Market power is proxied with the Lerner index, which 
represents the ability of banks to set prices above marginal cost
4
. Banks with a higher index 
are associated with greater market power. The choice of the Lerner index is consistent with 
recent literature (Ariss, 2010; Boateng et al., 2018). Steps to computing the index used in this 
study can found in Boateng et al. (2018).   
Following recent African ICT literature (Tchamyou, 2017), we use two ICT indicators, 
namely: the mobile phone penetration rate (per 100 people) and the internet penetration rate 
(per 100 people). The adoption of these variables is consistent with stylized facts on the high 
penetration potential of ICT in Africa (Hubani & Wiese, 2017; Isszhaku & Wiese, 2017; 
Minkoua Nzie et al., 2017; Muthinja & Chipeta,  2017). The dependent variables used in 
approximation of financial access are: loan price and loan quantity. These are measured 
respectively with ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘the logarithms of outstanding loan balances’ 
(Coccorese & Pellecchia, 2010).  
  Consistent with discussion in the recent African banking literature (see Asongu & Le 
Roux, 2016), three categories of control variables are used. These include: (i) market-oriented 
characteristics (comprising GDP per capita growth; Inflation and Population density); (ii) 
bank-related features (involving the number of Bank branches and the Deposit/Asset ratio) 
and (iii) the unobserved firm heterogeneity such as ‘compliance with Sharia finance’ (Non-
Islamic versus (vs) Islamic); size (large vs. small) and ownership structure (foreign vs. 
domestic). The expected signs are discussed in what follows.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zambia. 
4
 The lerner index is computed with the translog cost function. Details of the computation are available upon 
request.   
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 First, GDP per capita growth which takes business cycle fluctuations into account 
should positively influence loan quantity. Conversely, the expected effect on the price of 
loans is not easy to establish because such impact is contingent on both market dynamism and 
expansion. Hence, it is proposed that diminishing GDP per capita can influence both loan 
quantity and loan price in a scenario of decreasing demand. A negative impact may be 
expected from GDP per capita because over the past decade, GDP has been growing less 
proportionately than population growth (Asongu, 2013).   
Second, we expect the density of the population to positively impact both dependent 
variables. This is because, from intuition, an increasing demand for loans owing to rising 
population density is likely to raise loan prices.  
Third, the quantity (price) of loans should be logically decreased (increased) with 
inflation, other things being equal. To be sure, the rate of investment with associated demand 
for loans is expected to decline in periods of economic uncertainty (like rampant inflation). 
Consequently, the interest charged (or price of the loan) is likely to fall during periods of high 
inflation. This perception builds on the evidence that investors are more encouraged with less 
ambiguous economic environments (Kelsey & Le Roux, 2017a, 2017b).  
Fourth, the number of bank branches is expected to positively affect loan quantity and 
negatively impact the price of loans.  
Fifth, raising the ‘deposit to asset’ ratio is anticipated to increase both the quantity and 
price of loans. This is primarily because mobilised deposits are the principal source of bank 
financing. Hence, more liquid liabilities increase interest rate margins and/or quantity of 
loans, since good organisation and asset-liability management are imperative for the 
mobilisation of such bank resources.  
Sixth, anticipated effects from dummy variables which are used to account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity are not easy to establish. For instance, regardless of bank size 
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(small versus (vs). big), financial intermediation can be associated with both positive and 
negative effects resulting from movements in the credit market, although the adverse 
experience of large financial institutions are expected to be mitigated by their more 
sophisticated management and coordination systems. Nevertheless, addressing challenges that 
are naturally linked to the complications of dealing with a larger customer base is likely to be 
a source of inefficiency for large banks. In the same vein, the influence of heterogeneity in 
ownership structure (domestic vs. foreign) and ‘Sharia finance compliance’ (Non-islamic vs. 
Islamic) are contingent on a plethora of features such as: organisational mission and capacities 
as well as market dynamics.  
 Appendix 2 summarises the expected signs whereas Appendix 3, Appendix 4 and 
Appendix 5 show the definitions of variables (with their corresponding sources), the summary 
statistics and the correlation matrix in that order. The summary statistics informs that study 
that the considered variables are comparable in terms of means. Moreover, the corresponding 
standard deviation also informs that study that reasonable estimated linkages can be expected 
based on the considerable variations of corresponding variables. The correlation matrix is 
used to avoid concerns about multicollinearity or variables with a high degree of substitution 
in the conditioning information set.  
 
3.3 Methodology  
3.3.1 Generalised Method of Moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions 
 The adoption of the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) builds on five principal 
motivations. The first-two motivations are basic requirements for the choice of the technique 
whereas the last-three are corresponding advantages of employing the estimation approach. (i) 
Persistence in the dependent variable is taken into account by the estimation technique. 
Accordingly, the rule of thumb (0.800) for persistence in loan price and quantity is satisfied 
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because the correlation between these financial access variables and their first lags are 
respectively 0.845 and 0.996. (ii) The T<N criterion for the GMM strategy is also satisfied 
because there are 162 banks for a span of 11 years. Therefore, the number of banks (N) is 
substantially higher than the number of years (T) in each bank. (iii) The estimation approach 
controls for errors arising from (i) simultaeniety and (ii) time-invariant omitted variables in 
the regression model. (iv) The use of panel data framework helps to control for the 
unobserved heterogeneity across our bank units. (v) The system GMM estimator addresses 
inherent biases that are associated with the difference GMM estimator.  
 The empirical strategy adopted in this study is the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension 
of Arellano and Bover (1995). In essence, instead of employing the first-difference of the 
variables as instruments, the technique uses forward orthogonal deviations that have been 
documented in restrict instrument proliferation and/or limit over-identification (Baltagi, 2008; 
Love & Zicchino, 2006; Tchamyou, 2018). A two-step procedure is adopted in place of the 
one-step process because it corrects for heteroscedasticity.   
The following equations in level (5) and first difference (6) summarize the estimation 
procedure for loan quantity.  
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           where, tiLQ ,  
is loan quantity  of bank i
 
at  period t , 0 is a constant, 
 represents the 
coefficient of auto-regression, ICT  represents information and communication technology 
(mobile phone or internet penetration), MP  denotes Market Power approximated by the 
Lerner index, Inter  is the interaction between ICT and MP.
 
W  is the vector of control 
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variables  (GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank 
Branches)),
 i

 
are bank-specific effects (Small banks, Domestic banks and Islamic banks), t  
is the time-specific constant and ti ,  the error term. Equations (5) and (6) are replicated when 
the dependent variable is loan price. 
 It is important to discuss restrictions in identification and exclusion that are essential 
for a robust GMM specification.  In line with the recent literature, we consider all explanatory 
variables as suspected endogenous or predetermined while the time-invariant omitted 
variables are considered to be strictly exogenous (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). The 
identification condition is motivated by the awareness that it is not feasible for time-invariant 
omitted variables or ‘years’ to be endogenous in first-difference (Roodman, 2009b)5.  
 The statistical validity of the underlying exclusion restriction is investigated with the 
Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the exogeneity of instruments.  A failure to reject the 
null hypothesis of DHT implies that years or time invariant omitted variables explain loan 
price and quantity exclusively through the suspected endogenous variables. In the standard 
Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy, a rejection of the null hypothesis corresponding to the 
Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) is taken as a signal of the invalidity of the 
employed instruments (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b). This is not the case 
with the GMM with forward orthogonal deviations which employs the DHT as information 
criterion for exclusion restriction. Therefore, in the findings that are provided in Section 4, the 
exclusion restriction assumption is confirmed if the alternative hypothesis of the DHT 
corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is rejected. 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Hence, the process for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while the gmmstyle is used for 
predetermined variables.  
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3.3.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 The modelling strategy covered with the GMM strategy is based on mean values of 
loan price and loan quantity. This represents a shortfall of the implied blanket policies. 
Moreover, the underlying blanket policies may not be effective across countries with high, 
intermediate and low existing levels of financial access unless they are related to their initial 
levels of loan price and quantity. It is important to note that modelling exclusively at the 
conditional mean of loan price and quantity is addressed with the Quantile Regressions (QR) 
estimation technique because it examines the linkages throughout the conditional distributions 
of the dependent variable (Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012). Such an approach to understanding credit access has recently been used in 
clarifying the nexus between information sharing and financial access in Africa (see Asongu 
et al., 2016b). In the light of the above points, empirical studies that examine such effects with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are based on the assumption that the errors terms are normally 
distributed.  This proposition does not hold in the QR approach. Furthermore, assessing the 
robustness of parameter estimates at several points on the conditional distribution of loan 
price and quantity is consistent when outliers are apparent (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
The  th quantile estimator of financial access is obtained by solving the following 
optimization problem, which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (7) 
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where  1,0 . Contrary to OLS that is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, it is the weighted sum of absolute deviations that is minimised. 
For example, the 25
th
 quartile or 90
th
 decile (with  =0.25 or 0.90 respectively) are examined 
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by approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quantile of credit access or iy given 
ix is expressed as followed: 
 iiy xxQ )/( ,                                                                                                              (8) 
where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quantile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are examined only at the 
mean of the conditional distribution of loan price and loan quantity. In Eq. (8), the dependent 
variable iy  is the financial access variable (consisting of loan quantity and loan price 
respectively) whereas ix  contains a constant term, mobile phone penetration, internet 
penetration, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, Population density, Deposit/Assets, Number of 
Bank Branches, and bilateral dummy variables representing Small banks, domestic banks and 
Islamic banks.  
 The issue of endogeneity is addressed by instrumenting the ICT variables with their 
first lags. For instance, the instrumentation process of mobile phone penetration is disclosed 
in Eq. (9) below. 
  tiitijti MobileMobile ,1,,      ,                                                                                  (9) 
where tiMobile , , is the mobile phone penetration rate of bank i  
at  period t ,  is a constant, 
1, tiMobile , represents the mobile penetration indicator for bank i  
at  the previous period 
1t , i  
are bank-specific effects and ti ,  the error term.  
 The instrumentation process in Eq. (9) which is replicated for internet penetration 
consists of regressing an ICT variable on its first lags and then saving the fitted values which 
are then employed as the independent variables of interest in the OLS and QR. The 
specifications are Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in terms of 
standard errors. Moreover, through instrumentation, the OLS approach is transformed to a 
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Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) that accounts for both simultaneity and the unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
 
4. Empirical results 
Table 2 below presents the GMM results whereas Tables 3-4 show the findings corresponding 
to the Quantile regressions. Consistent variations in the estimated coefficients from the Two 
Stage Least Squares and Quantile regressions (in terms of sign, size and magnitude of 
significance) justify  our decision the adopt Quantile regression method. 
 For each dimension of financial access in Table 2, there are four specifications: two 
related to mobile phone penetration and two linked to internet penetration. Both ICT variables 
have two sub-specifications corresponding to full and partial samples. Whereas the partial 
sample is from 2005 to 2011, the full sample is for the period 2001-2011. The prime 
motivation underpinning the partial sample is that it helps to restrict instrument proliferation 
or over-identification since N is held constant while T is reduced. It is relevant to note that we 
are already limiting instrument proliferation by restricting the lag structure of the endogenous 
variable (which is limited to one) and collapsing instruments in the GMM specification. 
However, the partial sample further restricts instrument proliferation because T is decreased.  
Four principal information criteria are employed to examine the validity of the GMM model 
with forward orthogonal deviations
6
  and the findings are discussed based on these 
information criteria.  
                                                          
6 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence 
of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions 
(OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not 
correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the 
Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, 
we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. 
Fourth, a Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200). 
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The results are discussed in terms of marginal impacts, net effects and thresholds at 
which the policy variables (mobile phone penetration and internet penetration) influence 
market power to increase financial access in terms of loan price and loan quantity. For ICT to 
enhance financial access, marginal effects from interactions with market power should be 
negative and positive for loan price and loan quantity respectively. For example in the partial 
sample regression in third column of Table 2,  the net impact on average loan prices  of using 
mobile phones to effect changes in market power is positive (0.014)
7
. By contrast, the 
corresponding marginal effect (or conditional impact of market power) is negative (-0.0007).  
The implication is that a threshold of 54.285 (i.e., 0.038/0.0007) penetration per 100 people is 
required to reverse the sign of the unconditional effect of market power (0.038) from positive 
to negative. With respect to the average loan quantity regression, a threshold of 57 penetration 
per 100 people (i.e., 0.114/0.002) is required to counteract the positive impact of market 
power.  These estimated cut-off points are within the mobile phone penetration range of 0.000 
to 147.202 provided by the summary statistics. Interestingly, Internet penetration has no 
apparent impact on both loan price and quantity in all the regressions. Most of the significant 
control variables display the expected signs.  
The quantile regressions are presented in Table 3 and Table 4. The following findings 
can be established in Table 3 on the role of the mobile phones in mitigating the adverse effect 
of market power on financial access. There are no statistically significant relationships 
apparent from the ‘loan price’-oriented regressions. By contrast, from the ‘loan quantity’-
related regressions, there are positive marginal effects and net negative effects reported for the 
bottom and 90
th
 decile. The corresponding thresholds beyond which the unconditional 
negative effects of market power on loan quantity could be reversed to positive are 56.202,  
                                                          
7
 The net effect on the average loan price is computed from the interaction between mobile phones and market 
power on the one hand and unconditional market power effects on the other: That is 0.014 = ([-0.0007× 34.107] 
+ 0.038).  Where the mean value of mobile phone penetration is 34.107, the unconditional effect of market 
power equals 0.038 and the corresponding conditional impact of it estimated to be -0.0007.  
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52.040 and 42.761 penetration per 100 people at the 10
th
 decile, 25
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile 
respectively. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. 
The following findings can be established in Table 4 on the role of internet penetration 
in reducing market power for financial access. Again, whereas no significantly relevant 
results are apparent from ‘loan price’-oriented regressions, for ‘loan quantity’-related 
regressions, there is a positive marginal effect and net a negative effect only in the 90
th
 decile. 
The corresponding threshold beyond which the unconditional negative impact of market 
power on loan quantity could be reversed is 9.485 per 100 people penetration. Again, most of 
the significant control variables have the expected signs. 
The main explanation for the differences in findings throughout the conditional 
distribution of financial access variables is that, existing levels of access to finance influence 
the relevance of ICT in modulating the effect of market power on financial access. Moreover, 
it is apparent that mobile phone penetration is a comparatively better ICT policy tool for 
influencing market power, compared to internet penetration. This can be explained by the fact 
that the penetration of the internet is lower in the continent compared to mobile phone 
penetration. For instance, as shown in the summary statistics in Appendix 4, the average 
mobile phone penetration rate for the sampled countries and periodicity under consideration is 
34.107% while the corresponding average penetration of the internet is 7.268%.  
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Table 2: Financial access effects of reducing market power with ICT (GMM-IV)   
         
 Dependent variable: Financial Access  
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 Mobile Phone Penetration  Internet Penetration  Mobile Phone Penetration  Internet Penetration  
 Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Full Sample Partial 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Partial 
Sample 
Constant  0.028** -0.204** 0.042*** -0.013 0.502*** 0.153 0.261*** -0.064 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.001) (0.767) (0.000) (0.439) (0.000) (0.699) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.580*** 0.549*** 0.571*** 0.778*** --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Quantity of Loans  (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.959*** 1.026*** 0.992*** 1.012*** 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power  0.009 0.038** -0.012 0.009 -0.062 0.114** -0.080 0.042 
 (0.296) (0.023) (0.204) (0.516) (0.330) (0.041) (0.127) (0.498) 
Mobile 0.0001 0.0002 --- --- -0.001 0.001** --- --- 
 (0.230) (0.155)   (0.107) (0.043)   
Internet --- --- -0.0001 -0.00005 --- --- -0.001 0.001 
   (0.688) (0.916)   (0.624) (0.430) 
Mobile×Market Power  -0.0003 -0.0007*** --- --- 0.0001 -0.002*** --- --- 
 (0.127) (0.006)   (0.897) (0.009)   
Internet×Market Power --- --- 0.0008 -0.0001 --- --- -0.002 -0.001 
   (0.261) (0.845)   (0.430) (0.718) 
GDPpcg 0.0001 0.0008 0.0001 0.00007 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.676) (0.105) (0.730) (0.838) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 
Inflation  0.0001** -0.0000004 0.0002*** 0.0001* -0.0001 -0.00009 0.00003 -0.00004 
 (0.031) (0.995) (0.002) (0.098) (0.207) (0.336) (0.723) (0.598) 
Pop. density 0.00003** -0.000001 0.00002*** 0.00002** -0.0001 0.00006 0.00006 0.00004 
 (0.011) (0.959) (0.002) (0.037) (0.229) (0.424) (0.183) (0.590) 
Deposit/Assets 0.024 0.042 0.029* 0.086** -0.165* 0.156 -0.189** 0.150 
 (0.102) (0.123) (0.051) (0.011) (0.095) (0.162) (0.014) (0.197) 
Bank Branches -0.0003 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 0.003* -0.002 0.001 -0.004** 
 (0.342) (0.033) (0.001) (0.035) (0.074) (0.297) (0.456) (0.026) 
Net effect of Mobile na 0.014 --- --- na 0.045 --- --- 
Threshold of Mobile na 54.285 --- --- na nsa --- --- 
Net effect of Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
Threshold of Internet --- --- na na --- --- na na 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.159) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.080) (0.168) (0.129) (0.497) (0.025) (0.341) (0.029) (0.823) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.019) 
Hansen OIR (0.009) (0.400) (0.010) (0.258) (0.018) (0.101) (0.005) (0.149) 
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.147) (0.103) (0.125) (0.405) (0.303) (0.225) (0.219) (0.104) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.013) (0.744) (0.016) (0.233) (0.013) (0.127) (0.004) (0.324) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.044) (0.267) (0.165) (0.435) (0.177) (0.156) (0.005) (0.141) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.031) (0.706) (0.004) (0.133) (0.019) (0.164) (0.179) (0.349) 
         
Fisher  66.03*** 32.29*** 53.45*** 28.60*** 797.57*** 2774.03*** 1613.18*** 2248.70*** 
Instruments  42 41 42 41 42 41 42 41 
Banks 135 108 135 107 137 108 137 107 
Observations  646 139 633 138 656 139 643 138 
         
*, **, ***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients  and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) andAR(2) tests and; b) 
the validity of the instruments in the OIR and DHT tests. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects. nsa: not specifically 
applicable because the threshold effect is contrary to theoretical underpinnings. Mean value of Mobile is 34.107. Mean value of Internet is 
7.268. Range of Mobile: 0.000 to 147.202. Range of Internet is 0.037 to 51.000.  
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Table 3: Financial Access Effects of reducing Market Power  with Mobile Phone (2SLS and IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Price Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.117*** 0.056 0.107*** 0.104*** 0.120*** 0.166*** 6.083*** 4.455*** 5.941*** 5.874*** 5.382*** 6.614*** 
 (0.000) (0.274) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) -0.014 0.014 -0.032 0.008 -0.0001 -0.055 -4.758*** -4.159*** -5.152*** -4.719* -2.875* -2.694*** 
 (0.770) (0.879) (0.513) (0.865) (0.997) (0.383) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.076) (0.070) (0.000) 
Mobile (IV) -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.00004 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.053*** -0.037** -0.051** -0.054 -0.028 -0.029*** 
 (0.742) (0.871) (0.662) (0.950) (0.758) (0.867) (0.004) (0.043) (0.041) (0.135) (0.190) (0.001) 
Mobile(IV) ×Market Power(IV) 0.0002 -0.0005 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 0.0002 0.101*** 0.074** 0.099** 0.096 0.061 0.063*** 
 (0.797) (0.805) (0.518) (0.932) (0.678) (0.849) (0.002) (0.019) (0.022) (0.126) (0.100) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0007* -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.00008 -0.008 0.013 -0.036** -0.031 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.088) (0.276) (0.801) (0.293) (0.333) (0.919) (0.515) (0.190) (0.030) (0.262) (0.789) (0.125) 
Inflation  0.0001 0.00005 0.0001** 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.006*** 0.004 0.002 0.0008* 
 (0.138) (0.214) (0.029) (0.028) (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.000) (0.001) (0.184) (0.260) (0.077) 
Pop. Density 0.00002 0.00004* 0.00004*** 0.00001 0.00001 -0.00001 -0.0008*** -0.0003* 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.001* -0.0008* 
 (0.116) (0.061) (0.000) (0.259) (0.447) (0.480) (0.008) (0.068) (0.494) (0.871) (0.098) (0.077) 
Deposit/Assets 0.005 0.009 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.004 2.095*** 1.058*** 1.746*** 2.234*** 2.370*** 1.243*** 
 (0.555) (0.504) (0.660) (0.665) (0.264) (0.724) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.065*** -0.016** -0.061*** -0.067*** -0.087*** -0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.031) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.008** 0.015* 0.004 0.001 0.011** 0.011 -0.809*** -0.674*** -1.306*** -0.752*** -0.527*** -0.430*** 
 (0.030) (0.058) (0.238) (0.677) (0.028) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.003 -0.004 0.0004 0.006* 0.006 0.007 0.308*** 0.021 0.240* 0.516** 0.510*** 0.425*** 
 (0.333) (0.425) (0.877) (0.079) (0.155) (0.265) (0.005) (0.824) (0.092) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.022*** 0.0001 -0.022*** -0.038*** -0.014 -0.027** -0.417** 0.283 -0.166 -0.302 -0.529 -1.142*** 
 (0.003) (0.992) (0.007) (0.000) (0.242) (0.034) (0.034) (0.144) (0.653) (0.585) (0.139) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Mobile na na na na na na -1.019 -1.419 -1.487 na na -0.361 
Threshold of Mobile na na na na na na 47.108 56.202 52.040 na na 42.761 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.124 0.098 0.094 0.075 0.075 0.068 0.218 0.089 0.115 0.156 0.132 0.130 
Fisher  8.29***      27.50***      
Observations  620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 620 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial access is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effect of market power.  Mean value of IVMobile is 37.019. Range of IVMobile: 4.332 to 152.599.  
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Table 4: Financial Access Effects of reducing Market Power with the Internet (2SLS and IV QR) 
             
 Dependent variable: Financial Access 
 Loan Prices Effects  Loan Quantity Effects  
 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 2SLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant  0.128*** 0.065** 0.111*** 0.120*** 0.162*** 0.174*** 4.485*** 3.597*** 2.924*** 3.473*** 4.321*** 7.650*** 
 (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Market Power (IV) -0.024 -0.0004 -0.027 -0.013 -0.043 -0.060 -1.833* -2.463* -0.317 -0.410 -1.045 -2.637*** 
 (0.499) (0.992) (0.501) (0.700) (0.231) (0.282) (0.071) (0.067) (0.845) (0.764) (0.130) (0.000) 
Internet (IV) -0.001 0.0001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.069 -0.083 0.052 0.049 -0.020 -0.131*** 
 (0.436) (0.955) (0.452) (0.560) (0.627) (0.338) (0.318) (0.350) (0.632) (0.585) (0.654) (0.000) 
Internet(IV)×Market Power(IV) 0.002 -0.0008 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.157 0.182 -0.078 -0.022 0.094 0.278*** 
 (0.520) (0.867) (0.479) (0.600) (0.685) (0.428) (0.204) (0.261) (0.687) (0.892) (0.252) (0.000) 
GDPpcg -0.0007* -0.0007 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.014 0.012 -0.013 0.001 -0.017 -0.026** 
 (0.096) (0.309) (0.459) (0.247) (0.703) (0.794) (0.262) (0.164) (0.457) (0.964) (0.262) (0.030) 
Inflation  0.0001 0.00005 0.0001 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0005*** 0.002 0.002*** 0.005** 0.003 0.001 0.0008 
 (0.123) (0.220) (0.175) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.010) (0.244) (0.317) (0.145) 
Pop. Density 0.00002** 0.00004* 0.00004** 0.00003* 0.000008 0.000008 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.00004 -0.00006 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.032) (0.066) (0.013) (0.075) (0.637) (0.700) (0.002) (0.000) (0.923) (0.920) (0.005) (0.000) 
Deposit/Assets -0.0001 0.010 -0.003 -0.0003 -0.003 0.005 2.099*** 1.228*** 2.091*** 2.279*** 2.641*** 0.264 
 (0.989) (0.479) (0.766) (0.976) (0.746) (0.726) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.165) 
Bank Branches -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.070*** -0.022** -0.037** -0.101*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.018) (0.000) (0.034) (0.048) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  0.008* 0.014* 0.008 0.004 0.002 0.011 -0.785*** -0.672*** -1.313*** -0.905*** -0.572*** -0.689*** 
 (0.057) (0.067) (0.154) (0.429) (0.634) (0.211) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Domestic Banks 0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.008* 0.008 0.011 0.332*** -0.004 0.267 0.370** 0.621*** 0.566*** 
 (0.306) (0.251) (0.819) (0.060) (0.111) (0.145) (0.003) (0.965) (0.118) (0.044) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -0.030*** -0.0006 -0.025* -0.040*** -0.050*** -0.035 -0.432* 0.227 -0.068 -0.512 -0.499 -1.220*** 
 (0.000) (0.972) (0.053) (0.004) (0.001) (0.108) (0.092) (0.419) (0.881) (0.344) (0.163) (0.000) 
             
Net effect of the Internet na na na na na na na na na na na -0.466 
Threshold of Internet na na na na na na na na na na na 9.485 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.131 0.103 0.095 0.082 0.077 0.072 0.201 0.079 0.104 0.149 0.113 0.116 
Fisher  7.64***      25.45***      
Observations  601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 601 
             
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. 2SLS: Two Stage Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where financial access is least. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects and/or unconditional effect of market power.  Mean value of IVInternet is 7.809. Range of IVInternet is 0.786 to 57.230.  
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5. Conclusions and future research directions  
This study has assessed how information diffusion dampens the adverse effect of market 
power on financial access. It focuses on a panel of 162 banks from 39 African countries for 
the period 2001-2011. The empirical evidence is based on three simultaneity-robust 
estimation techniques, namely: (i) Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), (ii) Generalised Method 
of Moments (GMM) and (iii) Instrumental Variable Quantile Regressions  (QR). The 
following key results are identified. First, from the GMM findings, a mobile phone 
penetration rate of 54.285 and 57 per 100 people neutralises the positive effect of market 
power on loan price and quantity in that order. Second, from the QR, mobile phone 
penetration rates of 56.202, 52.040 and 42.761 per 100 people nullify the estimated negative 
effect of market power on loan quantity provided by the formal banking sector at the 10
th
 
decile, 25
th
 quartile and 90
th
 decile respectively while the corresponding counteracting 
threshold of internet penetration is considerably lower at 9.485 per 100 people only at the 90
th
 
decile. On average, between 2009 and 2011: (i) countries that do not meet the mobile phone 
penetration thresholds are Eritrea, Burundi, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda and Sierra Leon and (ii) countries that meet the internet penetration threshold 
are Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde , Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.  
The decision to complement an estimation technique, such as the GMM-IV approach 
which is based on conditional mean values of the dependent variable with a QR method that is 
based on multiple points of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable is apparent 
from our findings. These have revealed that blanket policies of information diffusion for the 
purpose of dampening market power for financial access may not be effective unless they are 
contingent on the initial levels of financial access across countries.  
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 A likely explanation as to why information diffusion reduces the adverse impact of 
market power on access to credit is related to the fact that innovative schemes such as mobile 
banking have helped to decrease the over-reliance on the formal banking sector for loans.  
Such could encourage banks, especially the large size financial institutions to lower ( raise) 
the price (quantity) of loans in the formal credit market.  
 In the light of the above, the policy and practical implications of this study are 
fivefold:  
First, market power in the African banking industry may be so strong that its effect on 
financial access cannot easily be modulated by ICT of low penetration. Hence, the 
insignificant findings should not be observed in the light of publication bias or the file drawer 
concern in social sciences, where compared to strong results that are more likely to be 
published,  insignificant and null findings are not published and discarded  (Rosenberg, 2005; 
Franco et al., 2014). The insignificance of ICT in modulating market power therefore has 
economic meaning if market power is high and/or information diffusion by means of ICT is 
low.  
Second, policies designed to boost ICT penetration in Africa would disproportionately 
increase the quantity of loan provided by the formal banking sector by reducing their market 
power in the African financial industry. Third, the statistically insignificant coefficient 
reported in the QR regressions for loan price is taken as an indication that ICT could be 
supplemented with other tools such as information sharing offices (involving public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus). Such complementarity should also be contingent on the 
initial levels of financial access in the country concerned. In summary, by adopting measures 
of universal ICT access, policy makers can substantially increase access to credit by 
households and corporations. Such universal access schemes may include the liberalisation of 
the ICT sector aimed at speeding up internet connections at relatively low prices.  
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Fourth, the above policies are not recommended in the light of a “one size fits all” 
kind of policy framework. For instance, countries with lower levels of loan quantity should be 
given more priority in internet penetration because we have seen that only countries at the top 
quantiles of loan quantity can potentially benefits from the role of the internet in modulating 
the effect of market power on financial access.  
Fifth, information shared through ICT mechanisms in Africa may not be of high 
quality in terms of accuracy, correctness and comprehensiveness. This is could also explain 
the insignificant relationships. Moreover, the insignificant nexuses could also be traceable to 
the absence of appropriate institutional frameworks, presence of weak legal systems and poor 
regulations governing ICT mechanisms.  
The factors in the fifth point, which are not explicitly considered in the regressions 
also double as a limitation of the study. Hence, future studies can focus on assessing how the 
suggested factors affect the established linkages. Another limitation of the study is that the 
policy prescriptions are not country-specific. Therefore, it is also worthwhile to assess 
whether the established linkages withstand empirical scrutiny from country-specific 
standpoints, in order to prescribe more targeted country-specific policy implications. Future 
inquires devoted to improve extant literature can also focus on alternative instruments with 
which market power can be dampened in order to enhance financial access in the African 
banking industry. For instance, the roles of information sharing offices, mobile banking and 
financial sector competition can be considered.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Estimates of the Cost Function 
    
  Battese–Coelli 
Parameters Regressors Coefficients Standard 
Errors 
0  Constant -0.2502** 0.1358 
Q  ln Q 0.8683*** 0.0331 
1  1lnW  0.0559 0.0623 
2  2lnW  0.5919*** 0.1143 
3  3lnW  0.2037*** 0.0557 
QQ    2ln 2Q  0.0127* 0.0067 
11    2ln 21W  -0.0139 0.0242 
22    2ln 22W  -0.1034* 0.0614 
33    2ln 23W  -0.0935*** 0.0262 
1Q  1lnln WQ  -0.0389*** 0.0086 
12  21 lnln WW   -0.0214 0.0305 
13  31 lnln WW   0.0335 0.0271 
2Q  2lnln WQ  -0.0068 0.0130 
23  32 lnln WW   -0.0240 0.0279 
3Q  3lnln WQ  0.0003 0.0078 
   
Log-likelihood 1021.2181 
Wald Chi-square 19818.07*** 
Observations 900 
Banks 151 
    
***, **,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
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Appendix 2: Summary of expected signs  
  
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
 
 
Appendix 3: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Mobile Phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Internet Penetration   Internet Internet penetration (per 100 people) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Market Power Lerner index The ratio of the ‘difference between the 
Marginal Cost and Price’ on the Price 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Loan Quantity   Quantity Logarithm of Loans  Quantity BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 4: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
ICT Mobile 34.107 32.409 0.000 147.202 1776 
       
 Internet 7.268 8.738 0.037 51.000 1757 
       
Market 
Power 
Lerner 0.513 0.587 0.032 0.969 893 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita growth 13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product.  
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Appendix 5: Correlation Matrix  
                 
Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls ICT Lerner  
GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Price Quantity Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Mobile Internet   
1.000 0.136 0.007 -0.008 -0.068 -0.014 -0.026 -0.0002 0.0002 0.034 -0.034 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.261 -0.122 -0.016 GDP 
 1.000 -0.028 0.037 -0.236 0.256 -0.009 0.046 -0.046 0.028 -0.028 -0.050 0.050 -0.315 -0.238 -0.062 Inf. 
  1.000 0.112 0.410 -0.029 -0.125 -0.098 0.098 -0.045 0.045 -0.088 0.088 0.056 0.335 0.035 Pop. 
   1.000 -0.041 0.080 0.306 -0.041 0.041 -0.062 0.062 -0.210 0.210 -0.087 -0.036 0.021 D/A 
    1.000 -0.266 -0.227 -0.078 0.078 0.135 -0.135 -0.051 0.051 0.610 0.747 0.109 Bbrchs 
     1.000 -0.075 0.094 -0.094 0.016 -0.016 -0.097 0.097 -0.206 -0.219 0.082 Price 
      1.000 -0.171 0.171 0.052 -0.052 -0.067 0.067 -0.096 -0.118 -0.038 Quantity 
       1.000 -1.000 0.026 -0.026 -0.020 0.020 0.146 0.089 -0.056 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.020 -0.146 -0.089 0.056 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.089 -0.089 0.151 0.039 0.147 Dom. 
          1.000 -0.089 0.089 -0.151 0.039 -0.147 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.045 -0.039 0.006 Islam 
            1.000 0.045 -0.032 -0.006 NonIsl. 
             1.000 0.634 0.089 Mobile 
              1.000 0.048 Internet 
               1.000 Lerner 
                 
Info: Information. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Domestic: Domestic banks. 
Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans. ICT: Information and Communication Technology. Mobile: mobile phone penetration. 
Internet: internet penetration.  Lerner: Market Power 
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